Slip and Fall-black ice

The Court of Appeals has recognized a possible exception to the prior written notice statute required for bring a personal injury action against the government. In San Marco v. Village/Town of Mount Kisco , the Court found that there was an issue as to whether village created black ice condition upon which plaintiff slipped and fell precluded summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals has held that the "immediacy" test for determining whether the "affirmative creation" exception to the prior written notice statute excused written notification in cases involving hazards caused by a pothole or manhole cover did not extend to cases involving hazards related to negligent snow removal. As such, a village could be liable for a negligent ice condition without receiving prior written notice, if it created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence. However, a fact issue as to whether the village created the black ice condition upon which the plaintiff slipped and fell precluded summary judgment in the plaintiff's personal injury action against the village.

Slip and fall

For attorneys to to bring a successful "slip and fall" lawsuit," it is necessary to prove that the property owner knew of the dangerous condition before the fall or the owner created the condition. Without proving knowledge or creation of the condition, the case will not succeed. A recent case in the second department demonstrated this. In Arzu v. County of Nassau the plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when he slipped and fell on water on the bathroom floor of the defendants' facility. The defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they did not create the alleged hazardous condition or have actual or constructive notice of it (see Otey v City of New York, 42 AD3d 515; Gallais-Pradal v YWCA of Brooklyn, 33 AD3d 660; Perlongo v Park City 3 & 4 Apts., Inc., 31 AD3d 409; Lowe v Olympia & York Cos. [USA], 238 AD2d 317). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, there was insufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants had actual notice of a recurring hazardous condition which proximately caused him to fall (see Gallais-Pradal v YWCA of Brooklyn, 33 AD3d 660; Perlongo v Park City 3 & 4 Apts., Inc., 31 AD3d 409). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.